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**THE BRITISH ATTITUDE TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
IN "THE BRUGES SPEECH" OF MARGARET THATCHER**

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The research question of the article is whether there were any differences in the British attitude towards European integration between the original British integration project of H. Macmillan which was submitted to the Cabinet at the beginning of 1961 and the British approach to European integration at the end of 1980s. The author analyzes in detail the speech of the Prime Minister M. Thatcher to the College of Europe (so called "The Bruges Speech") which proved to be of great help for the initiating research of the issue.

Key words: European integration, British attitude, the Bruges Speech of Margaret Thatcher.

Introduction

The first British complex plan of West European integration dates back to 1961. The British Prime Minister H. Macmillan tried to find means for binding Europe within the wider Atlantic Community. At the beginning of 1961 he submitted to the Cabinet his vision of European unification which was called "the Great Project".

Results

The main idea of the Macmillan's plan was that Europe might be organized in concentric circles with a political and military core, around which there should be an economic organization on a free trade basis. In that plan, the EEC should enter to a Free Trade Area as a separate unit. H. Macmillan planned to increase the influence of European political and defense structures of the NATO which were to organize the political and military circle. The Prime Minister suggested that the Atlantic alliance should have two pillars, a structure which would strengthen both the alliance and Europe's voice in it [4, p. 171]. To his mind, the UK had a special relationship with the US and thus, it could play a role of a bridge between Europe and North America. On the basis of it Britain could have the opportunity to take the lead in the European integration process and influence on the direction of its development.

On the other hand, Britain felt a threat from the countries of the Common Market which could form a close political association under French leadership. Initially this would have created a further political division and would also have had a disrup-

tive influence within the Atlantic Community. Eventually, it might have meant that the Six would have come to exercise greater influence than the United Kingdom, both with the United States and possibly with some of the independent countries of the British Commonwealth. This development was therefore a threat to the political position of the United Kingdom as a world Power.

In such a situation the British Prime Minister agreed, in his speech before the House of Commons that ‘our right place is in the vanguard of the [european] movement . . . and . . . we can lead better from within than outside’ [8]. Following 12 years Britain became an EEC member. One of the British purpose was controlling and influencing the political development of the countries of the Common market [1]. Did the British attitude towards European integration change at the end of 1980s? To answer this question the speech of then Prime Minister M. Thatcher to the College of Europe (so called “The Bruges Speech”) could be of great help.

M. Thatcher tried to summarize her position as the British Prime minister on European integration because “if one believes some of the things said and written about her views on Europe, it must seem rather “like inviting Genghis Khan to speak on the virtues of peaceful coexistence!”[2]. On the other hand there were ideas that M. Thatcher came to despair of the European project. Her Bruges Speech of 1988 became a template for a new generation of Tory sceptics. According to T. Helm “it was not given to put the country on course for an exit, but to limit Europe’s ambitions” [7]. Nevertheless, one may claim with great certainty that M. Thatcher did not belong to the eurosceptics. She had campaigned to stay in the EEC in 1975, four years before becoming prime minister, and signed the Single European Act in 1986. In her lecture she tried to chart the way ahead from the British point of view and identify the next steps.

First of all, M. Thatcher dispenses a wide spread myth that Britain was different from the continent in traditions, way of life and law system by emphasizing on the things which did not divide but unite Britain and other European countries. That was the common history. British links to the continent of Europe have been the dominant factor in its history. For three hundred years, Britain was part of the Roman Empire and its “maps still trace the straight lines of the roads the Romans built”. “Visit the great churches and cathedrals of Britain, read our literature and listen to our language: all bear witness to the cultural riches which we have drawn from Europe and other Europeans from us”. The British are rightly proud of the way in which, since Magna Carta in the year 1215, they have pioneered and developed representative institutions “to stand as bastions of freedom”. But without the European legacy of political ideas they could not have achieved as much as they did. From classical and mediaeval thought they have borrowed that concept of the rule of law which marks out a civilized society from barbarism. Common experience with other European countries strikes Britain most. For instance, the story of how Europeans explored and colonized – and in the words of M. Thatcher – civilized much of the world is “an extraordinary tale of talent, skill and courage” [2].

Exaggerating Britain’s role during World War II, M. Thatcher said that it was “from our island fortress that the liberation of Europe itself was mounted”. After the

war nearly 70,000 British servicemen were stationed on the mainland of Europe to strengthen NATO. All these things alone are proof of our commitment to Europe's future and Britain's identity with other European countries.

Britain had in a very special way contributed to Europe. Over the centuries Britain had fought to prevent Europe from falling under the dominance of a single power. That is why new developments of political nature within European Community proved to be a threat for the Britain as a world power. M. Thatcher questioned the identity of Europe itself. In her opinion Europe was not the creation of the Treaty of Rome. Nor was the European idea the property of any group or institution.

According to M. Thatcher the European Community was one manifestation of that European identity, but it was not the only one. The other one, about which M. Thatcher did not mention, was the British different vision of European integration. But its original vision of a trading area had been supplanted by Franco-German ambitions for political and economic union. The perspectives of European common defense policy within European Union would have undermined NATO and Britain's special relationship with the United States. M. Thatcher said that Britain had looked to "wider horizons – as had others – and thank goodness for that, because Europe never would have prospered and never will prosper as a narrow-minded, inward-looking club" [2].

The British Prime Minister M. Thatcher laid great hopes for the intergovernmental approach in the EU decision-making process which could make it easier for the UK to block undesirable decisions. The creation of European federative super state to which tended political integration was not of British support. However, contrary to the present decision of exit from EU, Britain did not "dream of some cozy, isolated existence on the fringes of the European Community". "Our destiny is in Europe, as part of the Community", M. Thatcher claimed. But, it was not within a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels. Therefore, the Community was not an end in itself.

Conclusions

Supporting the EEC enlargement Britain planned to strengthen the intergovernmental approach in the EU decision-making process in contrast to German ambitions for political and economic union based on supranational or federative principals. That is why M. Thatcher laid great hopes in her speech for the East European countries. "We must never forget that east of the Iron Curtain, people who once enjoyed a full share of European culture, freedom and identity have been cut off from their roots" [2]. For the purpose to ensure the future prosperity and security for the European Community people M. Thatcher proposed five guiding principles.

The first principle was this: "willing and active cooperation between independent sovereign states is the best way to build a successful European Community". The countries of Europe should speak with a single voice on many issues. "Europe is stronger when we do so, whether it be in trade, in defense or in our relations with the rest of the world". But working more closely together did not require power to be centralized in Brussels or decisions to be taken by an appointed bureaucracy. Indeed, it seemed ironic for M. Thatcher that just when those countries such as the Soviet Un-

ion, which had tried to run everything from the centre, were learning that success depended on dispersing power and decisions away from the centre, there were some in the Community who seemed to want to move in the opposite direction. For Britain, Europe should certainly be more united and with a greater sense of common purpose. But it must have been in a way which preserved the different traditions, parliamentary powers and sense of national pride in one's own country. To try to suppress nationhood and concentrate power at the centre of a European conglomerate would be highly damaging and would jeopardize the objectives of integration.

The second guiding principle was this: “Community policies must tackle present problems in a practical way, however difficult that may be”. If we cannot reform those Community policies which are patently wrong or ineffective and which are rightly causing public disquiet, then we shall not get the public support for the Community's future development. (M. Thatcher was right about this. It was exactly what has happened on the British referendum of 2016 which led to the decision of Brexit to be taken).

M. Thatcher suggested cutting the agriculture's share of the budget in order to free resources for other policies, such as helping the less well-off regions and helping training for jobs. She insisted on introducing a tighter budgetary discipline to enforce these decisions and to bring the Community spending under better control; on continuing to pursue policies which relate supply more closely to market requirements, and which will reduce over-production and limit costs.

The third guiding principle was “the need for Community policies which encourage enterprise”. The lesson of the economic history of Europe in the 1970's and 1980's was that central planning and detailed control did not work and that personal endeavour and initiative did. Following the neo-conservatives principles M. Thatcher argued that a State-controlled economy was a recipe for low growth and that free enterprise within a framework of law brings better results. By getting rid of barriers, by making it possible for companies to operate on a European scale, European Community could best compete with the United States, Japan and other new economic powers emerging in Asia and elsewhere. M. Thatcher believed that “our aim should not be more and more detailed regulation from the centre, it should be to deregulate and to remove the constraints on trade”. To prove her argument Thatcher took the City of London as an example. The City of London had long welcomed financial institutions from all over the world, which was why it was the biggest and most successful financial centre in Europe.

Regarding monetary matters, M. Thatcher argued that the key issue was not whether there should have been a European Central Bank. Instead the Community should implement the Community's commitment to free movement of capital (as they had it in Britain); abolish through the Community of exchange controls – in Britain, they abolished them in 1979; establish a genuinely free market in financial services in banking, insurance, investment; make greater use of the ecu [2].

The fourth guiding principle was that Europe should not be protectionist. M. Thatcher called for removing barriers to trade as the expansion of the world economy required us, and to do so in the multilateral negotiations in the GATT. She want-

ed to ensure that their approach to world trade was consistent with the liberalization they “preached at home”.

The last guiding principle concerned the most fundamental issue – the European countries' role in defense. M. Thatcher insisted on Europe continuing to maintain a sure defense through NATO. She regarded that it was to NATO that “we owe the peace that has been maintained over 40 years”. Therefore, there could be no question of relaxing Europe efforts, even though it meant taking difficult decisions and meeting heavy costs. Contrary to the attempts to create a European-based defense system M. Thatcher suggested to maintain the United States' commitment to Europe's defense. And that meant recognizing the burden on their resources of the world role they undertake and their point that “their allies should bear the full part of the defense of freedom, particularly as Europe grows wealthier”. For Thatcher it was not an institutional problem. NATO and the Western European Union were the institutions for the defense of Europe. They had long recognized where the problems of Europe's defense lay, and had pointed out the solutions. And the time has come when Europeans should give substance to their declarations about a strong defense effort with better value for money, but not with new defense institutions. Thatcher asked each member of the Alliance to shoulder a fair share of the burden. “We must keep up public support for nuclear deterrence, remembering that obsolete weapons do not deter, hence the need for modernisation. We must meet the requirements for effective conventional defence in Europe against Soviet forces which are constantly being modernized. We should develop the WEU, not as an alternative to NATO, but as a means of strengthening Europe's contribution to the common defense of the West” [2].

M. Thatcher called the EU countries never forget that their way of life, their vision and “all we hope to achieve, is secured not by the rightness of our cause but by the strength of our defense”. That approach (to construct European Union looking outward not inward, and which would have preserved the Atlantic community) did not require new documents. They were all there, the North Atlantic Treaty, the Revised Brussels Treaty and the Treaty of Rome.

ЛІТЕРАТУРА

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БРИТАНСКИЙ ПОДХОД К ЕВРОПЕЙСКОЙ ИНТЕГРАЦИИ В «БРЮГГСКОЙ РЕЧИ» МАРГАРЕТ ТЭТЧЕР

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В статье исследуется британский подход к европейской интеграции. Автор отвечает на главный исследовательский вопрос: произошло ли изменение в подходе Великобритании к европейской интеграции через пятнадцать лет после того как Британия стала полноправным членом ЕЭС и каковы должны были быть направления его развития согласно позиции британского правительства. Брюггская речь М. Тэтчер легла в основу проведенного в статье сравнительного анализа.

Ключевые слова: европейская интеграция, позиция Великобритании, «Брюггская речь М. Тэтчер».

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НЕКОТОРЫЕ АСПЕКТЫ РАЗВИТИЯ ПРАВА СОБСТВЕННОСТИ НА ПРИРОДНЫЕ РЕСУРСЫ

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В статье рассматриваются отличительные особенности права собственности на природные ресурсы как один из важнейших факторов социально-экономического развития государства. Обосновываются предложения по дальнейшему совершенствованию природоресурсного законодательства, а также расширение круга субъектов права частной собственности и видов природных ресурсов, передаваемых в частную собственность. При этом учитывается, что природные ресурсы, предназначенные удовлетворять потребности человека, принадлежат всему обществу, причем одновременно настоящему и будущему поколениям. Соответственно в общественных отношениях, регулируемых правом, природные ресурсы должны восприниматься как общественное (национальное) достояние. При этом проявляется ряд проблемных вопросов, требующих своего решения, с учетом многогранных экономических, политических, социальных и юридических аспектов, обеспечивающих рациональное их использование и сохранение природных ресурсов для будущих поколений людей.

Ключевые слова: аренда природных ресурсов, право государственной собственности, право частной собственности, исключительная собственность государства, природные ресурсы, природные объекты, растительный мир, земли сельскохозяйственного назначения, общественное (национальное) достояние, государственный суверенитет.

Введение

В соответствии со статьей 13 Конституции Республики Беларусь [1] государство осуществляет регулирование экономической деятельности в интересах